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HE 2001 Survey period1 resulted in fewer legislative changes and
dramatic administrative and judicial interpretations than some had
expected. The Legislative Session, in particular, failed to produce
the sweeping tax reform, or even semi-sweeping tax relief, for which
some had hoped. Most tax bills died an early death and very few tax bills
with a positive fiscal note even made it out of the House Ways and Means
Committee sessions. Nonetheless, the Comptroller's Technical Correc-
tions and Enforcement Bills, as well as numerous other bills dealing with
taxes, including property tax, once again changed Texas law.
I. SALES TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
Macias v. Rylander2 addressed a licensed customs broker (although
temporarily unlicensed because the court upheld the 90-day suspension of
the custom broker's license) authorized to issue export certificates. On
March 11, 1995, a Mexican citizen purchased several items of clothing
from a Marshall Fields store in San Antonio. As the court noted, that
same afternoon the purchaser sought an export certificate from a Macias
employee. The employee issued a stamped export certificate to the pur-
chaser stating the day of export as March 11, 1995. The purchaser used
the export certificate to return to Marshall Fields to claim the sales tax
exemption and receive her refund. She did not take the merchandise
from the United States to Mexico until March 13, 1995. The comptroller
subsequently notified Macias of a proposed suspension of his customs
broker's license. The court engaged in a relatively detailed summary of
the comptroller's argument (focusing on the fact that the export certifi-
cate included incorrect information) and Macias's explanation (that the
merchandise had entered "the export stream of commerce at the time of
purchase").
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Administrative hearings again covered a waterfront of tax topics, pro-
ducing far too many decisions to discuss in this context.3 A few adminis-
trative decisions, though, deserve discussion. Several focused on the
distinction between tangible personal property and real property. Hear-
ing No. 38,388,4 for example, addressed the characterization of two eight-
thousand gallon storage tanks which were placed on a concrete pad and
surrounded by permanent walls. The tanks were not affixed to the
ground and were fitted with lifting lugs. Relying on Hearing No. 35,136,5
which held that a forty-two foot, forty-thousand pound kettle was ma-
chinery or equipment, the Administrative Hearings Section ("AHS") as-
serted that the tanks were personal property. The administrative law
judge ("AL") disagreed, finding the tanks an improvement to real prop-
erty, and thus excluded from taxation. Although the most important con-
sideration was the intent of the parties, important factors were that the
tanks and related items were affixed to the realty during the same con-
struction operation by one contractor, that the whole facility was con-
structed by the taxpayer where no previous facility had existed, and that
the concrete pad and walls around the tanks would serve no purpose
without the tanks (indicating that the tanks were intended to be perma-
nent). The AU noted that removability was not a bar to a finding that an
item is an improvement to realty. 6
The distinction between personal property and improvements to realty
was also at issue in Hearing No. 38,760.7 The comptroller relied on the
test in Hutchison v. Masterson & Street8 to determine whether property
(in this case, overhead cranes, leased and installed at the taxpayer's facil-
ity) were improvements to real property. The comptroller concluded that
the cranes were improvements to realty, finding that the size, weight, cus-
tomization, and the fact that the overhead cranes were left in the facility
after the petitioner moved to a new location, indicated the parties' intent
that cranes would be permanent. The language in the lease of the cranes
indicating that they were personal property did not control, as contract
language has not in the past controlled these determinations. 9
Hearing No. 38,43210 also focused on the manufacturing exemption.
The first issue involved the dredge pipe and pumps used to carry slurry
3. The difficulty of distinguishing non-taxable new construction from taxable repair
and remodeling presents itself at the courthouse as well. See GATX Terminals Corp. v.
Rylander, Nos. 96-10815 & 98-13414 (Tex. Dist. Ct., summary judgment entered for state
May 29, 2001).
4. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,388 (July 18, 2000).
5. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,136 (Jan. 21, 1997).
6. The taxpayer in Hearing No. 38,388 also unsuccessfully argued that an eye wash
station at its facility was exempt under the manufacturing exception because it was "neces-
sary and essential" to the manufacturing process.
7. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,760 (Jan. 12, 2001).
8. 46 Tex. 551 (1877).
9. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 36,177 (Oct. 30, 1998), 23,572 (Oct. 10,
1988).




from a cutter head to the dewatering plant. These dredge pipes and
pumps, which are utilized after the beginning of the manufacturing pro-
cess, were found to fall within section 151.318(c)(2), 11 which states that
intraplant transportation equipment is not exempted. The petitioner also
argued that these pipes and pumps were exempt because they were pollu-
tion control equipment. Although it is true that these items prevented
pollution, the AU reasoned that the exemption for pollution equipment
was intended only for those items that were required by law. The tax-
payer prevailed, however, with respect to the second issue, the dewater-
ing plant, as the comptroller concluded that "all equipment and
machinery that acts upon the product once the actual manufacturing pro-
cess starts will be considered to be within the exemption whether or not
the specific item of equipment 'processes' the tangible personal prop-
erty. '"12 The ALJ also provided the taxpayer an exemption for a produc-
tion belt system that moved the product from the dewatering plant to
another processing plant nearly two miles away. The AHS claimed that
this was intraplant transportation equipment. The ALJ noted that this
would normally be the case, but that these conveyor belts each had a flat
section specifically designed to remove water from the mixture, and that
without these special sections, the mixture would be useless when it
reached its destination. Thus, the Decision found that the entire con-
veyor belt system qualified for the manufacturing exemption.
In Hearing No. 39,831,13 the claimant contended that because he was a
licensed and certified carrier, his purchases of repair, remodeling, and
maintenance services on aircraft and purchases of repair and replacement
parts were exempted from taxation. However, the claimant was a carrier
in the pipeline business, not the airline business, and the comptroller con-
cluded that the exemption under section 151.32814 and Rule 3.29715 spe-
cifically refers to the transportation of people or equipment for hire.1 6
The AU determined, however, that the labor was exempt pursuant to
section 151.0101,17 which does not require that the person be involved in
carrying people or cargo for hire.
Whether fertilizer and seeds used at a municipal golf course were ex-
empt was at issue in another hearing.18 The contractor-taxpayer, having
contracted with a municipality to operate a golf course, claimed that the
seeds and fertilizer were exempt under section 151.311(a) 19 as tangible
personal property incorporated into realty of an exempt entity; the tax-
payer also claimed that lawn maintenance services and bunker recon-
11. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
12. Hearing No. 38,432 (July 11, 2001) (citing Hearing No. 36,005 (October 6, 1997)).
13. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,831 (July 6, 2001).
14. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
15. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297 (West 2000 and 2001).
16. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 35,637 (May 23, 2001), 30,845 (May
23, 2001) (dealing with the definition of carrier for exemption purposes).
17. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0101 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
18. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,369 (July 2, 2001).
19. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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figuration services were exempt under Rule 3.356(a)(5) 20 using a similar
analysis. The comptroller disagreed, and reasoned (incorrectly, perhaps)
that if the products and services were not sold directly to the exempt
entity, they could not be exempted from tax.21
In another exempt-entity case, a contractor claimed a sales tax exemp-
tion for materials for a house built for the president of a ministry exempt
under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.22 The contractor
received an exemption certificate from the president, but the AiU, citing
Rule 3.287(f), 23 found that the certificate failed to state that the items
would be used in a manner that qualifies the sale of the items for an
exemption from tax, and that there was no evidence that the home con-
struction related to the ministry's exempt purpose. The project also
failed to satisfy section 151.310(a)(2),2 4 which provides that the item may
not be used for the personal benefit of a private stockholder or
individual.
Another construction ruling, Hearing No. 39,325,25 could create diffi-
culties for many taxpayers. The construction contract price was deter-
mined by a formula that took into account the total cost of labor and
materials, but did not distinguish between incorporated and consumed
materials. The AU found that under Rule 3.291(5)26 the sales tax was
the contractor's responsibility because this was a lump-sum, rather than a
separated contract. This holding could be somewhat troubling, because
many taxpayers, especially in smaller contracts, follow the literal lan-
guage of Rule 3.291,27 and simply separate out labor and materials. Al-
though taxpayers with sophisticated in-house or outside advisers may
break out incorporated materials from consumed materials, 28 not all tax-
payers do so, and the comptroller has not consistently required such a
breakdown.
Several recent cases involve the use of electricity that aids in the refrig-
eration of food products. In one,29 the petitioner, who was not an actual
manufacturer of the food products, claimed that the electricity used to
keep its warehouse at a particular temperature were exempt under sec-
20. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356(a)(5) (West 2001).
21. The result in this case appears correct, given the petitioner's failure to meet its
burden of proof, although the analysis may not apply in other cases.
22. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2002).
23. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.287(f) (West 2001).
24. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.319(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
25. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,325 (Nov. 15, 2001).
26. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291(a)(5) (West 2001).
27. Id.
28. Moreover, even sophisticated taxpayers often conclude that separating out con-
sumed materials is not cost effective. (Note that this decision also addressed semiconductor
clean rooms.)
29. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,093 (May 2, 2001). See also Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,371 (Jan. 2, 2001) for a similar analysis.
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tions 151.31730 and 151.318.31 Based on several previous rulings32 and
Texas Citrus Exchange v. Sharp,33 the AU denied the petitioner's conten-
tion, using the rule that the lowering of the temperature of food is exempt
processing, but that maintaining the food at a desired temperature is not
considered processing, because no physical change is taking place.34
Hearing No. 39,09235 denied the taxpayer's claim that its services,
which involved performing consulting services in the areas of workplace
safety, emergency response, hazardous substances, and compliance with
OSHA standards, were not taxable insurance services. Factors that led to
this decision included that the company focused on developing programs
for non-subscribers to the Texas Workers Compensation program and
that it provided referrals of agents and adjusters to its clients. Another
hearing debated the definition of amusement services. 36 A country club
claimed that the predetermined fees paid to it by a homeowner's associa-
tion for the maintenance of tennis and swimming facilities were not taxa-
ble because they did not give the association a special privilege, status, or
membership classification. 37 Even though the association was not an in-
dividual, the comptroller determined that because an individual home-
owner could not join the club without being a member of the
homeowner's association, the club was given a special privilege, status, or
membership classification, and the payments were taxable.
Multiple letters continue to develop and refine the comptroller's analy-
sis of taxable services. One letter, for example, addresses a monthly sub-
scription fee paid by car dealers to a company that provides "an Internet-
based marketing program and Online services to attract potential pur-
chasers."'38 Members of the public can access the website at no charge in
order to provide or receive information concerning the nearest car dealer.
30. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.317 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
31. § 151.318.
32. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 7,378 (Dec. 20, 1976).
33. 955 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ).
34. Hearing No. 39,370 involves a food distribution company that failed to prevail in
its argument that it should be entitled to a refund of sales taxes paid on its electricity
purchases pursuant to the court ruling in Texas Citrus Exchange v. Sharp. Texas Citrus had
prevailed by convincing the court that it used electricity as part of the processing of orange
juice, and was therefore entitled to the manufacturing exemption with respect to the elec-
tricity charges. In this administrative hearing, however, the judge concluded that the tax-
payer's facts were different from those in Texas Citrus, and that the taxpayer's lowering the
temperature of food products delivered to it did not constitute processing. The comptrol-
ler agreed that the taxpayer received processed, packaged food product in bulk quantities,
and repackaged it in smaller quantities before shrink wrapping. However, the administra-
tive law judge concluded that most of the products had been processed and packaged by
others, precluding the taxpayer's qualifying as a manufacturer. In some respects, the dis-
cussion in this case is interesting to review in light of the comptroller's policy of allowing a
manufacturer to subcontract out manufacturing steps without losing its status as a
manufacturer.
35. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,092 (Feb. 2, 2001).
36. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,407 (April 13, 2001).
37. If the petitioner's contention were true, this would be exempt. See 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.298(a)(8) (West 2001).
38. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200104201L (April 16, 2001).
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A car dealer is required to pay the monthly subscription fee even if it is
never selected as being the nearest dealer. The ruling concludes (cor-
rectly) that the essence of the transaction described is a non-taxable ad-
vertising service rather than taxable data processing or taxable
information services. 39
Key letters also confirm, in a change of comptroller policy, that, when
the essence of a transaction is advertising, sales tax does not apply to
charges for internet advertising by newspapers or broadcasters. 40
The claimant in Hearing No. 38,980,41 the owner and operator of pay
telephones, contended that the care, custody, and control of the equip-
ment was transferred to the users of the telephones and that thus it was
exempt from tax on its purchases under section 151.302(b) 42 and Rule
3.344(e). 43 In ruling against the taxpayer, the AU noted several recent
rulings44 that rejected the petitioner's argument. A "highly determinative
factor" was the "very transitory nature" of the use of the equipment by
the customer.
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Comptroller's Technical Corrections Bill,45 like most technical cor-
rections bills, includes both minor, technical changes as well as more sub-
stantive changes that are arguably less technical. In many areas,
legislation cleaned up troubling provisions of the Tax Code and offered
taxpayers guidance in areas in which guidance had been missing.
The legislature amended section 151.007(a)(3) 46 to provide that no de-
duction is permitted from the sales price of a taxable item for installation
of tangible personal property. Another definitional change, one that is
likely to produce litigation, involves the definition of "taxable item."
Having concluded in 2000 that a music CD delivered electronically is tax-
able in the same manner as a CD purchased at the corner store,47 the
comptroller sought to shore up her position that the music CD is tangible
personal property. Therefore, the comptroller suggested and the legisla-
ture adopted a change in the definition of taxable item. As amended, the
definition of "taxable item" provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by this chapter, the sale or use of a taxable item in electronic form instead
39. Numerous other letters address Internet-related issues. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts., Letter No. 200107354L (July 10, 2001) (stating that virus protection, if sold with
Internet access or data processing, is taxable).
40. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200106290L (June 11, 2001) and unpublished
letter dated Oct. 15, 2001 (on file with Survey editor).
41. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,980 (Feb. 26, 2001).
42. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.302(b) (Vernon 1992).
43. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.344(h) (West 2001).
44. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts., Hearing Nos. 32,054 (Oct. 6, 1995), 33,201 (Oct. 6, 1995),
29,744 (June 24, 1994).
45. Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1263, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3001.
46. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
47. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200005359L (May 30, 2000).
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of on physical media does not alter the item's taxable status. '48 Although
the policy of taxing items that are delivered in a "traditional" tangible
format the same as those that are delivered electronically or by other less
traditional methodology is an admirable one, this legislative "fix" is un-
likely to eliminate controversy in this area, particularly because the defi-
nition of "taxable item" allows taxpayers to argue that unless an item is a
taxable item in the first place, the statute has no bearing on it.49
New section 151.302150 provides an exemption for certain wrapping
and packaging supplies, including hangers and inventory tags, purchased
by a person that is a laundry or dry cleaner for use in packaging items
that have been pressed and dry cleaned or laundered. While this particu-
lar provision is a new exemption, the Technical Corrections Bill also
adopted clarifying changes that confirm the scope of existing exemp-
tions.5 ' Section 151.317,52 for example, which authorizes an exemption
for certain gas and electricity, was revised to make clear that equipment
used as described in section 151.318553 (dealing with broadcasters) is also
eligible for this electricity exemption.54
The manufacturing exemption itself, section 151.318, which has
changed repeatedly over the past several sessions, changed again this
session.55
One of the most significant sales tax changes in the Comptroller's Tech-
nical Corrections Bill is a new provision-not a clarification-that ad-
dresses divergent use of property used in manufacturing. In the past, the
comptroller has taken the position that property previously purchased
sales-tax-free pursuant to the manufacturing exemption becomes fully
taxable at the moment it ceases to be used for manufacturing and is used
for another purpose. Particularly in the context of certain high-tech
equipment, such as equipment that is used first to produce software for
48. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.010 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
49. For other legislative changes to taxable items, see, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.0036 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (stating that the charge for selling real property at a fore-
closure sale is not taxable debt collection service). Additional water-related exemptions
now appear in the Tax Code as a result of exemptions enacted by Act of June 15, 2001, 77th
Leg., R.S., ch. 966, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch.
1234, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2881. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.355 (Vernon Supp.
2002); see also id. § 151.3021; id. § 151.310 (tax-free sales); id. § 151.313 (healthcare sup-
plies) (now including a new subsection (c) defining a drug or medicine in this context).
50. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3021 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
51. Id. § 151.057 (services by employees); id. § 151.155 (creating exceptions to diver-
gent used treatment under § 151.155 for property use pursuant to § 151.3181); id.
§ 151.501(d).
52. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.317 (Vernon 1992 and Vernon Supp. 2002).
53. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3185 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
54. Section 151.317(a)(2) is actually intended to refer to "section 151.3185 or section
151.318 by a person ...." The cross-references to sections 151.318 and 151.3185 are re-
versed (i.e., the statute as enacted refers to "151.318 or 151.3185" instead of "151.3185 or
151.318"); this erroneous ordering is apparently a drafting error triggered by someone's
placing these two sections in numerical order. However, the intent of the statute is clearly
to confirm the availability of the exemption for broadcasters.




sale, but later used to provide services, this interpretation troubled tax-
payers, who could be faced with an assessment, several years after
purchase, based on the full purchase price of property. 56 Many taxpayers
were also uneasy with the mechanism by which the comptroller calcu-
lated use tax on equipment that was used in part for purposes other than
manufacturing. New section 151.318157 addresses these concerns. The
statute defines divergent use as use other than the manner or purpose
that qualified the sale for exemption to begin with, 58 and provides that
divergent use of property that occurs after the fourth anniversary of the
date the property is purchased will not result in sales and use tax. The
statute also includes a formula for imposing a proportionate amount of
tax for divergent use prior to the fourth anniversary. 59 The statute fur-
ther provides for a five percent de minimus rule (so that use tax is not
imposed as a result of divergent use in a month that does not exceed five
percent) 60 as well as providing for formulas based on hours or output.
This new section, which reflects a great deal of work by both comptrol-
ler's staff and industry, should reduce significantly the uncertainty con-
cerning divergent use of property originally purchased for manufacturing.
Section 151.318561 has its roots in the manufacturing exemption. Prior
to the 1999 legislative amendments, the items exempted by this section
(which deals with broadcasting and motion pictures) were exempt under
the manufacturing exemption. However, in 1999 the legislature enacted
new section 151.3185 to move these motion picture and broadcast exemp-
tions to a separate section. The 2001 legislature's technical correction to
this section confirms that the sale of a motion picture or video or audio
master by the producer is exempt,62 and that certain equipment, pur-
chased by broadcasters that are subject to FCC regulations mandating
digital broadcasts, is also exempt.63 Both these provisions are intended to
be clarifications to the Tax Code.64
Despite the relative scarcity of sales tax exemption provisions, there
were others. For example, section 151.321 was amended to provide an
exemption from sales and use taxes for certain taxable items sold by a
qualified student organization affiliated with an institution of higher edu-
56. Although the statute of limitations for sales taxes is generally four years (See TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 111.201) (Vernon 1992)), various exceptions to and tollings of the stat-
ute frequently extend the assessment period well beyond four years. See, e.g., TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 111.025, 111.206 (Vernon 1992 and Supp. 2002).
57. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3181 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
58. Id. § 151.3181(a)(1).
59. Id. § 151.3181(c). It provides that the amount of tax due for a month is based on 1/
48th of the purchase price multiplied by the percentage of divergent use during that month.
60. Id. § 151.3181(d).
61. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3185 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
62. Id.
63. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.3185(e)-(f) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Subsection (f) is
designed to confirm that broadcasters that acquire certain equipment in conjunction with
federal mandated digital operations are allowed to purchase the equipment on a tax-free
basis.
64. The comptroller has confirmed several times that these are clarifications. See, e.g.,
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, TAX POLICY NEWS 14 (July 2001).
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cation, 65 and the legislature amended section 151.052 to provide a new
mechanism concerning sales and use tax of printed materials distributed
by mail.66
Among the completely new sections added to the sales tax code are
two that reach from off-road trucks to mobile telephones. New section
151.051567 imposes a one percent surcharge, to be collected and adminis-
tered in the same manner as the sales tax, on the retail sale lease or rental
of certain equipment, including off-highway trucks, tractors, and paving
equipment.68
New Section 151.06169 covers almost three pages of Vernon's pocket
part with complex rules that combine Texas sales and use tax principles
with the federal Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act.
70
C. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
Effective July 22, 2001, the comptroller adopted a rewritten Rule
3.29171 dealing with contractors. This amended rule is designed not only
to reflect legislative changes that have occurred since the last amendment
to the Rule 3.291,72 but also to take into account policy decisions and
administrative hearings in several areas, including those with respect to
construction for an exempt entity. As revised, the rule includes a new
definition of consumable items. Prior Rule 3.291 described consumable
items as "[tiangible personal property, other than machinery and equip-
ment, that is not physically incorporated into the property of a customer
and that, after being used for its intended purposes, is substantially used
up, or is not retained or reusable by the contractor. ' 73 The new defini-
tion of consumable items is "[n]ondurable tangible personal property that
is used to improve realty and, after being used once for its intended pur-
pose, is completely used up or destroyed.
74
65. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.321 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (enacted by House Bill 82
(a/k/a the "Cheerleader Bill")).
66. This section allows the purchaser of certain printed materials that will be delivered
by the United States Postal Service to individual recipients in and outside Texas, other than
the purchaser, to issue an exemption certificate to the printer instead of paying sales tax.
This multistate exemption certificate for services requires that the materials are for multis-
tate use and that the purchaser will pay any state taxes that may become due.
67. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0515 (Vernon Supp. 2002) ("Texas Emissions Reduc-
tion Plan Surcharge").
68. Id. § 151.0515(a). Section 151.0515 expires Sept. 30, 2008. Id. § 151.0515(d).
69. TEX. TAX CODE ANN § 151.061 (Vernon Supp. 2002) ("Sourcing of charges for
Mobile Telecommunication Services"). The Survey authors gambled that most readers
would not expect or need a detailed summary of these complex provisions. Our apologies
to anyone who hoped to see a summary here.
70. 4 U.S.C. §§ 116-26 (2001)
71. 26 Tex. Reg. 5434.
72. Rule 3.291 had not been amended since 1992, and therefore failed to reflect the
numerous legislative and/or policy changes that have occurred since then.
73. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291 (2001).
74. Id. Examples of consumable items are "nonreusable concrete forms, nonreusable
drop cloths, barricade tape, natural gas and electricity. The term 'consumable item' does
not include machinery, equipment, accessories to machinery or equipment, repair or re-
placement parts for machinery or equipment, or any rented or leased item." Id.
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Given the examples of drop cloths and barricade tape, it should be a
fair inference that the "completely used up or destroyed" portion of this
definition is not intended to impose a stricter standard than the "substan-
tially used up, or. . . not retained or reusable by the contractor"; moreo-
ver, comptroller representatives have confirmed orally that the new
definition will not be interpreted to impose a stricter standard than the
former rule.
The new rule also addresses scope of "Exempt Contracts." Section
3.291(a)(5) (which defines an exempt contract as a "contract for the im-
provement of real property with an entity that is exempted under Tax
Code § 151.309 or § 151.310") 75 provides that an exempt contract "is a
contract with a nonexempt entity to improve real property for the pri-
mary use and benefit" of certain exempt organizations. Although the
comptroller has frequently attempted to rely on this "primary use and
benefit test," it appears to be without statutory support and should be an
example rather than a limitation.
Section 3.291(d), as it appears in the new rule, provides that develop-
ment work means "a contract with a private party to improve real prop-
erty by building public infrastructure, such as roads or sewer lines,
provided the improvements are dedicated to and will be accepted by a
governmental entity."'76 This definition too should be viewed as an exam-
ple of, rather than a limitation on, the definition of "exempt contract,"
although the language is not as clear on this point as it could be.
The rule also includes some new (and non-statutory) time lines con-
cerning deduction documentation for private development projects, and
exemption certificates. 77
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. For example, Rule 3.291(d) provides that "[t]he private party must dedicate the
realty and the improvements to the governmental entity before the work begins, and the
governmental entity must accept or conditionally accept the realty and the improvements."
(emphasis added) However, there appears to be no statutory basis for requiring that the
dedication documentation be completed before the work begins. Also, the reality of deal-
ing with governmental entities is that they are often required to complete several procedu-
ral (and political) steps prior to accepting, even conditionally, the realty and/or
improvements. As a result, in many cases construction begins well before the documenta-
tion is completed. To impose a timing requirement such as the one suggested by the new
version of the rule could effectively either delay construction or allow the comptroller to
argue that a taxpayer should not receive an exemption for which it qualifies under the
statute.
Section 3.291(c)(2), which deals with contractor liability, provides that if the comptroller
subsequently determines that an organization is not an exempt organization, the contractor
will be liable for all taxes, penalties and interest unless the contractor had accepted an
exemption certificate "at the execution of the contract." This requirement also appears to
impose a timing requirement that is not supported by the statute; indeed, the Tax Code





A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
Rylander v. Fisher Controls Int'l, Inc. 78 focuses on a taxpayer that filed
suit to recover franchise taxes paid under protest for the years 1992 and
1993. Fisher manufactured in Texas certain items that it sold to buyers in
other states during calendar years 1991 and 1992. In a case that focuses
carefully on the throw-back rule, the court reviewed the statutory provi-
sions at issue, including section 171.1032. 79 As the court pointed out, af-
ter the 1993 amendments to section 171.1032, this section provides that
Texas receipts result from sales "of tangible personal property shipped
from this state to a purchaser in another state in which the seller is not
subject to any tax on, or measured by, net income, without regard to
whether tax is imposed."80 When the legislature added the new language,
it provided explicitly that the amendatory act would take effect on Janu-
ary 1, 1994, and would apply to reports originally due on or after that
date. In the taxpayer's-and ultimately the court's-view, the phrase
"subject to taxation" for years prior to the statutory amendment must be
interpreted without reliance on the 1993 statutory addition. As the court
pointed out, it is altogether possible for a taxpayer to be subject to taxa-
tion "in the sense that the tax [does] not offend the Constitution of the
United States," even when the state in which the taxpayer is thus "subject
to taxation" does not actually impose an income-based tax.81
The court concluded that the phrase "not subject to taxation" is ambig-
uous and therefore open to construction. The court also refused to accept
the comptroller's argument that the 1993 amendment was "merely a clari-
fying amendment not intended to change the law."'82 The court pointed
out that the comptroller's Rule 3.549,83 as then in effect, although techni-
cally applicable to taxable capital component only, expressly stated that
the term "subject to taxation" referred to constitutional nexus. The court
further concluded that if the comptroller's argument were correct, then
the legislative statement that its interpretation would apply to reports
filed on or after January 1, 1994, would be surplusage. Finally, the court
declined to follow the comptroller's administrative interpretation, point-
ing out that the task of statutory construction at issue in this particular
case did not involve a matter lying particularly within agency expertise. It
instead involved a non-technical question of law-legislative intent-de-
termined from the legislature's use of the term "not subject to taxation"
in context. "Courts are as competent as the comptroller in making that
assessment of legislative intent."'84 The court ultimately concluded that
78. 45 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.).
79. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1032 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Rylander, 45 S.W.3d at 298.
82. Id. at 300.
83. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549 (2001).
84. 45 S.W.3d at 301.
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the fact that Fisher could have been taxed in the other states-even
though those other states did not actually impose a tax on Fisher-was
sufficient to justify a finding that Fisher was "subject to tax" in those
other states; therefore its receipts from sales into those states should not
be included in Texas receipts. This case is important not only for its spe-
cific holding, but also because it demonstrates the court's approach to
corrective legislative changes, especially those enacted to support a con-
tested comptroller interpretation.
In Upjohn Co. v. Rylander,85 the appellate court concluded, as had the
district court, that the franchise tax statutes at issue must be strictly con-
strued, and that under this strict construction Upjohn was not entitled to
the refund of franchise taxes it sought. The analysis in this case focuses
on section 171.10486 which provides that receipts from certain drug and
medicine sales may be deducted from gross receipts for taxable capital
purposes. As Upjohn pointed out, the Tax Code sections defining gross
receipts for taxable capital purposes contain provisions identical in many
respects to the sections defining gross receipts for earned surplus pur-
poses. Upjohn therefore contended that, notwithstanding the fact that
Section 171.10487 (earned surplus) fails to match the language of
171.10388 (taxable capital), the legislative intent had been to exclude drug
and medicine receipts from the gross receipts for purposes of computing
both earned surplus and taxable capital. Upjohn asserted that because
Section 171.10489 is partly an apportionment formula, which determines
the taxable base, it should be considered an "imposition type item" and
construed strictly against the comptroller. The court concluded, on the
other hand, that because the calculation at issue involved a deduction, the
provision at issue was "tantamount to an exemption and must be strictly
construed in favor of the state." (Once the court makes this determina-
tion, it's reasonably easy to predict the outcome of the case.) After dis-
cussing both the policy of the franchise tax and the purpose of the 1991
amendments to the franchise tax,90 and giving substantial weight to the
comptroller's interpretation of the statute, as well as dismissing Upjohn's
constitutional challenges, the court ultimately concluded the comptrol-
ler's interpretation was reasonable and that the receipts in question were
not deductible. Nor did Upjohn prevail on its request for penalty waiver
as the court concluded that the comptroller's refusal to waive penalty was
not "outside her discretionary authority."
Taxpayers continue to contest the comptroller view that pensions and
post-retirement obligations cannot be deducted from taxable capital for
85. 38 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
86. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.104 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
87. Id.
88. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
89. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.104 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
90. 38 S.W.3d at 604 (stating that the purpose of the 1991 amendments was "to redis-
tribute the franchise tax burden from capital-intensive industries that have lower earnings
and net worth to more profitable industries").
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franchise tax purposes. GMC challenged this interpretation, arguing that
ERISA 91 preempted the franchise tax provisions at issue. Observing that
the facts and arguments at bar were "virtually indistinguishable" from
those advanced in Sharp v. Caterpillar92, the court declined to revisit the
issue or overrule Caterpillar.
Decision 36,97793 demonstrates again the difficulty the comptroller's
office has faced in recent years in its efforts to reach a consistent interpre-
tation of the franchise tax as it applies to partnership revenue. The cor-
porate taxpayer in this hearing successfully argued that reimbursements it
received from partnerships should not be included in gross receipts for
apportioning gross receipts; the administrative hearing section ("AHS"),
on the other hand, asserted that in the partnership context, as in the cor-
porate context, "reimbursements" which may be excluded from gross re-
ceipts, include only amounts paid for goods or services supplied by third
parties. The agreed finding of facts indicated that the reimbursements at
issue, which included amounts for marketing, legal fees, auditing fees, of-
fice rent, and other expenses, were made at cost. In holding for the tax-
payer, the AU concluded that "the three key elements that are
prerequisites for an agency relationship" had been demonstrated, 94 and
recognized that Rule 3.557(e)(19), 95 which addresses allocation of inter-
corporate expenses, had not been previously applied to partnerships. The
decision therefore concludes that the at-cost partnership reimbursements
receipts of a taxpayer do not constitute revenue for gross receipt pur-
poses. The case also addresses the taxpayer's contention that in appor-
tioning earned surplus, the partnership net profits should be reported as
the taxpayer's gross receipts. The findings of fact included a finding that
generally acceptable accounting principles provide that a controlling part-
ner in a partnership should include its pro rata interest in the partnership
as part "of the controlling partner's consolidated financial statement and,
as such, that the controlling partner shall include its share of the partner-
ship's gross receipts as part of the controlling partner's gross revenue."
The comptroller ultimately allowed the taxpayer to report its partnership
net profits as gross receipts for purposes of apportioning earned surplus.
In his legal analysis, the ALU ultimately determined that a prior decision,
Hearing No. 35,123,96 was inconsistent with the case at bar and therefore
overruled Hearing No. 35,123. The judge also agreed with the taxpayer's
argument that the amount shown on its K-i's should be used for federal
tax reportable revenues rather than "gross receipts" of the
partnership. ' 97
91. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
92. 932 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
93. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,977 (Feb. 16, 2001).
94. Id. at 27 ((1) mutual consent that (2) one party will act for the other and (3) sub-
ject to the other's control).
95. TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557(e)(19) (2001).





Several comptroller ruling letters offer additional planning certainty
for taxpayers who desire to know, prior to the completion of their trans-
action, what the tax impact will be, particularly in the context of reorgani-
zations into partnership form.
At least one letter 98 confirms the comptroller's view that "location of
payor" and "legal domicile" are the same for both taxable capital appor-
tionment and earned surplus apportionment, and notes that Rule 3.55799
will be amended so that it too contains definitions of location of payor
and legal domicile consistent with Rule 3.549.100
B. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
Several rules were amended, including Rule 3.578 (dealing with Eco-
nomic Development Credits),1 1 which provides additional guidance con-
cerning credits available against franchise tax, including research and
development, jobs creation and investment credits, and Rule 3.549.102
C. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Legislative franchise tax provisions this past session did not enact
wholesale changes to the franchise tax, but did make several noteworthy
changes. Multiple changes addressed credits, 10 3 including those enacted
during the 1999 session. As previously noted,10 4 the comptroller has en-
countered difficulty in consistently interpreting provisions of the
franchise tax as they apply to partnerships. In an effort to conform the
statute to the comptroller's litigating position, the legislature amended
section 171.1032,105 which deals with the apportionment of franchise tax
receipts, to add to the laundry list of receipts those receipts from "each
partnership or joint venture to the extent provided by subsection (c).' 10 6
Subsection (c) in turn provides that a corporation is to include in its gross
receipts the corporation's "share of the gross receipts of each partnership
and joint venture of which the corporation is a part apportioned to this
state as though the corporation directly earned the receipts, including re-
ceipts from business done with the corporation." To the comptroller's
credit, following the enactment of this provision, the comptroller moved
quickly to settle several cases dealing with receipts and partnerships.
However, this section, which does not focus specifically on issues faced by
corporations that hold interest in multi-tiered partnerships, fails to re-
98. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 20010737L (July 19, 2001).
99. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557 (2001).
100. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549 (2001); but see 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 5.4501
(2001) (amending the rule).
101. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.578 (2001).
102. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549 (2001) (Taxable Capital Apportionment).
103. See, e.g., TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.076,171.501, 171.705, 171.721,171.752; see gener-
ally subchapters P, Q, R and S of the franchise tax code for other changes.
104. Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 53 SMU L. REV. 1297, 1317-22 (2000)
(summarizing the 1999 changes).




solve adequately the multi-tiered issue.107 Moreover, the reference to the
corporation as "a part" of a partnership is likely to trigger more confu-
sion.108 Another litigation-based change is the amendment to Section
171.110(e). It explicitly provides that a business loss can be carried for-
ward only by the corporation that incurred the loss, not by any other
entity, including the survivor of a merger with the loss entity. Another
partnership-related change, not listed as a clarification, is a new subsec-
tion 171.109(n), added to require a corporation to use the equity method
of accounting when reporting an investment in a partnership or joint
venture. 109
Among the other franchise tax changes this session are ones that im-
pact banking. The legislature amended section 171.106110 to provide that
a banking corporation shall not include in the numerator of its apportion-
ment factor any interest earned on federal funds or on securities sold
under an agreement to repurchase that are held in this state in a corre-
spondent bank domiciled in this state.
The legislature also added a new section 171.851111 providing the total
credit claimed on a report, including carryover credit, may not exceed the
amount of franchise tax due for the report period. 112
III. PROPERTY TAX
As with other Survey periods, there were many cases decided and At-
torney General opinions issued during the Survey period that are strong
reminders to taxpayers that exemptions are interpreted narrowly" 3 and
that failure to follow procedural rules can be a taxpayer's death knell."14
There were, however, several cases decided during the Survey period in
which courts appeared to interpret exemptions more broadly and gave
taxpayers some leniency on procedural issues. Some of these cases are
sprinkled among the cases discussed below.
107. Id.
108. The legislature also made corresponding changes. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.1051 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (apportioning gross receipts for earned surplus); id.§ 171.1121 (gross receipts for taxable earned surplus). A corporation's share of a partner-
ship's gross receipts that is included in the corporation's federal taxable income must be
used in computing the corporation's gross receipts.
109. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
110. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
111. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 171.851 (Vernon Supp. 2002); see also supra note 103 and
accompanying text.
112. Id. (providing that the amount of refund due under this provision is the lesser of
$5,000 or 25% of the amount of franchise tax for any one credit period before any other
applicable credits). The legislature made similar changes to several other franchise tax
credit provisions, and changes to §§ 171.754, 171.756.
113. See, e.g., Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0415 (2001) (stating that the portion of a resi-
dence that is rented does not qualify for the residence homestead exemption).
114. See, e.g., Bexar Appraisal Dist. v. Wackenhut Corrections Corp., 52 S.W.3d 795(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.) (holding that the taxpayer could not appeal a
denial of an exemption because it failed to challenge timely the denial).
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A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX/EXEMPTIONS
In Fairchild Aircraft v. Bexar Appraisal District,"1 5 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals addressed the taxability of an aircraft that was between
commercial aircraft leases on the first day of the tax year. The aircraft at
issue was typically leased to certificated air carriers and used as a com-
mercial aircraft." .6 However, from January 1, 1997 to October 1997, the
aircraft was not being leased and was hangared in Bexar County for re-
pairs and maintenance. 117 The appraisal district asserted that property
taxes should be imposed on the aircraft for the 1997 year, and the trial
court agreed.118 The taxpayer asserted that the aircraft was exempt
under section 21.05(c) 119 for the 1997 year. Section 21.05(c) provides that
a commercial aircraft that is removed from air transportation service for
repair, storage or inspection is presumed to be in interstate or foreign
commerce and not located in Texas for more than a temporary period;
thus, an aircraft meeting section 21.05(c) would not be taxed. 120
On appeal, the court first addressed the issue of whether the aircraft
was a "commercial aircraft" and thus subject to section 21.05. The ap-
praisal district argued that the test is whether the aircraft is a commercial
aircraft on January 1 alone (i.e., a snapshot approach); because the air-
craft was not being leased on January 1 to a certificated air carrier, it was
not a commercial aircraft for the 1997 year.1 21 The court rejected this
argument, concluding that an aircraft's status as a commercial aircraft for
a tax year should be based on its use in the immediately preceding
year.' 22 During 1996, the aircraft was used as a commercial aircraft. In-
deed, the court noted that the appraisal district's snap-shot argument
could lead to outrageous results as an aircraft not being treated as a com-
mercial aircraft even if it was leased to a certificated air carrier for every
day of the year except January 1.123
The court then considered the appraisal district's assertion that section
21.05(c) is unconstitutional because it exempts property without a consti-
tutional basis. The court held that section 21.05(c) is constitutional be-
cause it provides a method for allocating to Texas the portion of the
aircraft's value that fairly reflects its Texas use rather than being an ex-
emption statute.' 24
115. 47 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). Fairchild is a mirror
case to First Aircraft Leasing., Ltd. v. Bexar Appraisal Dist., 48 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
116. Fairchild, 47 S.W.3d at 579.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.05(c) (Vernon 1992).
120. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.01 (Vernon 1992). Only property located in Texas on
January 1 of the tax year for longer than a temporary period is generally subject to Texas
property tax for that year.
121. Fairchild, 47 S.W.3d at 579.
122. Id. at 581.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 583. The court relied on the reasoning in Appraisal Review Bd. of Galveston
County v. Tex-Air Helicopters, Inc., 970 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1998). In Tex-Air, the court ad-
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In Letter Opinion JC-0372,137 the Attorney General addressed ques-
tions relating to the pollution control exemption set forth in section
11.31.138 Section 11.31 exempts from property tax property that is being
used for the control of air, water and land pollution.139 The Attorney
General first addressed whether equipment that is of a type new to a
location that is used to make a product and by its design limits pollution
can qualify for the pollution control exemption. In other words, query
whether equipment can be considered to reduce pollution if it controls
pollution from a facility that was not there before the pollution control
equipment was added. The Attorney General ruled that the pollution
control exemption applies equally to property controlling pollution at a
new facility as it does to property controlling pollution at an existing facil-
ity. 140 Simply, there is no basis for limiting the exemption only to pollu-
tion-control property added to an existing facility. 141 The Attorney
General next addressed whether pollution-reducing production equip-
ment can qualify for the exemption. The argument against such equip-
ment qualifying for the exemption is that production equipment is a
source of pollution, and thus should not qualify for the exemption even if
it produces less pollution than other equipment producing the same prod-
uct.142 The Attorney General rejected this argument, and ruled that this
type of equipment can qualify for the exemption (although the exemption
would be on only part of the equipment, that which controls pollution). 143
B. PROCEDURE
In a case of first impression, the Amarillo Court of Appeals in Western
Athletic Clubs, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District144 held that a tax-
payer is not entitled to a review by the appraisal review board of the chief
appraiser's determination with respect to a taxpayer motion under sec-
tion 25.25(b). 145 Section 25.25(b) authorizes the chief appraiser to cor-
rect a name, address, property description, clerical error or other
inaccuracy as prescribed by board rule that does not increase tax liabil-
ity.146 In Western Athletic Clubs, the taxpayer requested in 1999 that the
appraisal district correct the 1983-87 appraisal rolls to reflect that certain
property rendered as personal property was in fact real property fix-
tures.147 The appraisal district denied the taxpayer's request, and the tax-
137. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0372 (2001).





143. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.31. See supra note 136 and accompanying text for a
discussion of legislation designed to address difficult interpretive issues raised by the pollu-
tion control exemption, including issues raised in Letter Opinion JC-0372.
144. 56 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).
145. Id. at 274; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
146. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
147. Western Athletic Clubs, 56 S.W.3d at 271.
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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Compass Bank v. Bent Creek In-
vestments, Inc.125 addressed the liability as between a purchaser and a
seller of the property for rollback taxes under section 23.55.126 Section
23.55 imposes rollback taxes on land that previously was specially ap-
praised as open-space property (or agricultural property). 12 7 For prop-
erty tax purposes, open-space property is taxed based on the land's
capacity to produce agricultural products instead of its higher market
value.'2 8 However, when the property's use changes from agricultural
property, the owner must pay rollback taxes under section 23.55 for the
last five years equal to the tax on the difference each year between its
market value and its agricultural value, plus interest.1 29 In Compass
Bank, the relevant property, which was agricultural property, was sold in
December 1995.130 The appraisal district later determined that the prop-
erty's use changed in 1996; thus, rollback taxes were imposed on the
buyer.' 3' The buyer sued the seller, asserting that the seller breached the
warranty in the sales contract guaranteeing that there are no encum-
brances on the property as of the date of sale.132 In support of its posi-
tion, the buyer submitted to the court an affidavit of the property lessee
that the property was not being used for agricultural purposes in 1995,
before the sale.133 The buyer was granted a summary judgment at the
lower court.134 In reversing the lower court and holding that there was
not sufficient evidence to grant the summary judgment, the court rea-
soned that a change of use does not occur as a matter of law. 135 Rather,
the appraisal district must determine that a change of use occurs, and a
tax lien does not exist until such a determination is made. 136
dressed the constitutionality of the allocation formula used under Section 21.05(b), which
allocates use to Texas based on revenue departures, and concluded that the formula used
was a reasonable allocation formula and not an unauthorized exemption.
125. 52 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
126. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.55 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
127. Id. § 23.55(a).
128. Id. § 23.52.
129. Id. § 23.55(a).
130. Compass Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 422.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 422.
134. Id. at 423.
135. Compass Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 424-25.
136. Id. at 424. This case gives practitioners reason to revisit their form real estate sales
contracts relating to open space land. For example, consider the following scenario:
It is expected that the buyer will change the use promptly following the sale
of the property on July 1, 2002, and the "deal" is that the seller will pay the
rollback taxes that relate to years prior to the sale. The sales contract pro-
vides that the seller will reimburse the buyer for rollback taxes that are calcu-
lated for years prior to the sale date. However, the appraisal district
determines that the change of use occurs in January, 2003. Based on Com-
pass Bank, it is not clear that the buyer will be indemnified fully for the
rollback taxes imposed on it. In this case, the buyer should insist that the
sales contract address the possibility that the appraisal district determines
that the change of use occurs later than the parties anticipate.
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payer protested the denial to the appraisal review board.' 48 The
appraisal review board notified the taxpayer that it did not have the au-
thority to review or change appraisal rolls under section 25.25(b). 149 The
taxpayer sued, claiming that it had a right to have the appraisal review
board hear its protest.150 Specifically, the taxpayer asserted that section
41.41(a)(9), 151 which provides that a property owner is entitled to protest
before the appraisal review board any action of the appraisal district that
applies to and adversely affects the taxpayer,152 affords the taxpayer a
vehicle to protest the denied section 25.25(b) motion.153 The court re-
jected this argument, concluding that section 25.25 does not provide for
the review of any action by the appraisal district under section 25.25(b),
although it expressly provides for such a review with respect to motions
made under section 25.25(c) and (d). 154 The court further reasoned that
section 41.41(a) does not apply to section 25.25(b) given that: (i) section
41.41(a)(9) applies only if the taxpayer is adversely affected by the ap-
praisal district's action; and (ii) section 25.25(b) is not a vehicle whereby
the taxpayer can be adversely affected by the appraisal district's action
because section 25.25(b) cannot be used to increase a taxpayer's tax
liability.155
In Comerica Acceptance Corp. v. Dallas Central Appraisal District156
the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a lienholder as of January 1 of a tax
year that is in possession of taxable personal property collateral on Janu-
ary 1 for purposes of selling it in a foreclosure is not the owner of the
property for tax purposes for that tax year and is not liable for the prop-
erty taxes on the item for the year.157 Under section 32.07(a),158 property
taxes are generally imposed on the owner of the property on January 1 of
the tax year.' 59 The term "owner" is not, however, defined in the Tax
Code. The appraisal district contended that a secured party in possession
of the collateral on January 1 is the owner of the collateral for property
tax purposes and is liable for the property taxes on the collateral for that
year. In addressing this issue, the court relied on two rules of statutory




151. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.41(a)(9) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
152. Id.
153. Western Athletic Clubs, 56 S.W.3d at 273.
154. Id.
155. Id. The court's reading of the term "adversely affected" as used in section 41.41(a)
seems to be extremely narrow. Although section 25.25(b) cannot be used as a vehicle to
increase a taxpayer's tax, one would think that a taxpayer is still "adversely affected" if the
appraisal district rules against the taxpayer on a section 25.25(b) motion.
156. 52 S.W.3d 495 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
157. Id. at 499.
158. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.07(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
159. Id.; but see id. § 25.07(a) (stating that certain leasehold interests in real estate are
taxed to the lessee if the lessor is exempt).
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authority; 160 and (2) when a term is not defined in the statute, the term is
given its ordinary meaning. 161 The court concluded that a lienholder does
not possess the attributes of a typical owner, such as the benefit of prop-
erty appreciation, the risk of lost value, and the right to possess the prop-
erty.' 62 In addition, taxing a lienholder on the market value of the
property would be unfair because the lienholder can only recover from
the property the debt balance, which can be less than the value of the
property. 163 Furthermore, if lienholders were treated as owners for prop-
erty tax purposes, the curious result of a single property having multiple
owners for property tax purposes would occur.164 The court expressly
rejected the conclusion of General Electric Capital Corp. v. City of
Corpus Christi,165 which held that a secured party in possession is the
same as the title owner for property tax purposes.' 66
A Houston Court of Appeals in Harris County Appraisal District v.
United Investors Realty Trust167 held that it is not necessary for a taxpayer
to obtain an independent appraisal to prove inequality of appraised val-
ues under section 42.26(d).168 There, the taxpayer purchased a shopping
center in January 1998 for $15.2 million, and the appraisal district ap-
praised the shopping center at $13.9 million for the 1998 tax year. 169 The
taxpayer protested the appraisal, which the appraisal review board up-
held, and then sued, claiming unequal appraisal under section 42.26(d).170
Section 42.26(d) provides that a court shall grant a taxpayer relief if the
taxpayer's property is appraised unequally such that the property's ap-
praised value exceeds the median appraised value of a reasonable num-
ber of comparable properties appropriately adjusted. 17' In support of the
taxpayer's position that section 42.26(d) applied, the taxpayer called an
expert valuation witness, who stated that the taxpayer's property was ap-
praised at $13 more per square foot than the median appraised value per
square foot of a reasonable number of comparable properties ($85 per
square foot versus $62 per square foot). 172 Based on this inequality of
160. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Park Stemmons, Ltd., 948 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1997, no writ).
161. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 312.002(a) (Vernon 2000); City of Dallas v. Cornerstone
Bank, 879 S.W.2d 264, 270 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
162. Comerica Acceptance, 52 S.W.3d at 497-98.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 498.
165. 850 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
166. Id. at 599. Justice LaGarde, in a dissenting opinion, stated that the court should
have applied the Texas Supreme Court's language in Childress County v. State, 127 Tex.
343, 92 S.W.2d 1011 (1936) in which the Court stated that the owner of property for prop-
erty tax purposes includes one in possession of the property that also possesses such claims
and evidences of ownership as will justify that he is the owner. Comerica Acceptance, 52
S.W.3d at 500 (LaGarde, J., dissenting).
167. 47 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
168. Id. at 653; TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.26(d) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
169. United Investors Realty Trust, 47 S.W.3d at 649.
170. Id.
171. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.26(d) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
172. United Investors Realty Trust, 47 S.W.3d at 650.
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appraisal, the taxpayer requested that its appraised value be lowered to
approximately $10 million (163,000 square feet times $62 per foot). 173
However, the taxpayer did not submit as evidence any appraisals of any
properties. 174 The appraisal district asserted that section 42.26(d) should
be interpreted to require a determination of the market value of the
property at issue in order to establish the variance between appraised
values to market values of the subject property and the purported compa-
rable properties. 175 The court rejected the appraisal district's position
and expressly ruled that section 42.26(d) does not require that the tax-
payer obtain independent appraisals. 176 The court reasoned that section
42.26(d) was added in part to facilitate remedies to taxpayers for unequal
appraisals and that requiring independent appraisals would be inconsis-
tent with this purpose. 177
In Conroe Creosoting Co. v. Montgomery County1 78 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the tax assessor was not entitled to summary
judgment on the basis that it had qualified immunity from a damages
claim for improperly seizing the taxpayer's entire business in collecting
on a tax deficiency judgment rather than seizing only those assets needed
to satisfy the judgment. 179 In Conroe the tax entity obtained a tax judg-
ment for approximately $74,000.180 The judgment contained a finding
that the taxpayer's personal property had a fair market value of approxi-
mately $800,000.181 The tax entity, however, seized the taxpayer's entire
facility and demanded that operations cease and that all employees
leave.1 82 The entire facility was held for almost two months. The tax-
payer asserted that the tax units then sold assets critical to the company's
business, instead of less critical assets such as autos, to satisfy the judg-
ment. Total sale proceeds were $362,000, and $241,000 of this was used to
satisfy taxes, attorneys' fees and expenses. 183 The taxpayer never re-
opened for business.
Although the tax assessor admitted that he acted under the mistaken
impression that the tax unit obtained a tax warrant rather than a writ of
execution, the taxpayer asserted that the assessor was aware of his mis-
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 651.
176. Id. at 653.
177. United Investors Realty Trust, 47 S.W.3d at 653. The court also held that section
42.26(d) is constitutional. Id. The appraisal district asserted that to interpret section
42.26(d) as not requiring a determination of market value would result in the provision's
being unconstitutional because the Texas Constitution requires all properties to be taxed in
proportion to market value. Id. at 654; TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b). Rejecting the ap-
praisal district's argument, the court stated that the Texas Constitution also requires equal
and uniform taxation (TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a)) and that equality and uniformity pre-
vail for the market value requirement. United Investors Realty Trust, 47 S.W.3d at 654.
178. 249 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2001).
179. Id. at 342.
180. Id. at 338.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 339.
183. Conroe Creosoting, 249 F.3d at 339.
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take before the sale occurred. 184 The taxpayer sued the tax assessor for
violation of its substantive due process rights. Absent a statutory waiver,
in order to prevail on a substantive due process claim against a govern-
ment official, his or her activity must be so egregious and outrageous that
it shocks our conscience. 185 The court held that there were sufficient is-
sues of fact to avoid a summary judgment on this issue, including that the
assessor signed the order authorizing the sale and the closing of the
business. 186
C. LEGISLATION
Appraisal districts, assessors and taxpayers have come to expect the
Texas Legislature to tinker each session with procedural property tax
rules, and the 77th Texas Legislature was no exception. Many of these
procedural changes are noteworthy. However, the key property tax
changes in 2001 probably relate to exemptions. Not surprisingly, the
Texas Legislature adopted or expanded several exemptions in order to
encourage economic development.
To encourage large-scale capital investment in Texas, the Texas Eco-
nomic Development Act 87 permits (but does not require) school districts
to limit the appraised value for purposes of the school district's mainte-
nance and operations property tax rate (but not its debt service rate) im-
posed on new business property meeting detailed requirements set forth
in the Act to a specified dollar amount ($100 million for very large school
districts, decreasing on a sliding scale as the size of the school district
decreases) for up to eight years beginning in the third year following the
approval of the exemption by the school district.188 In addition, if ap-
proved by the school district, the new business is entitled to a credit after
the end of the exemption period for school district property taxes that
would have been exempted had the exemption also applied for the first
two years following the approval of the exemption. 89 The exemption can
be granted only to corporations and limited liability companies. 190 One
of the key conditions to qualifying for the exemption is that the property
must be used for manufacturing, research and development or renewal
184. Id.
185. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
186. Conroe Creosoting, 249 F.3d at 342.
187. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. Ch. 313 (Vernon Supp. 2002). The new tax value limit
adopted by the Texas Economic Development Act is not a new exemption that requires
constitutional authorization because it fits within the parameters of the exemption author-
ized by article VIII, section 1-g of the Texas Constitution by virtue of the Act requiring the
property to be in a reinvestment zone formed by the relevant municipality. See TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 313.021(2)(a)(i) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Thus, a taxpayer attempting to bene-
fit from Chapter 313 will need the cooperation of the city, the comptroller and the school
district.
188. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 313.027 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
189. Id. §§ 313.102 and 313.104.
190. Id. § 313.024(a). Another condition to qualifying for the value limitation is that a




energy electric generation. 191
There were also several important legislative changes to the tax abate-
ment provisions during the session. Most importantly, the sunset provi-
sions to the tax abatement statute were extended to September 1, 2009.192
However, after September 1, 2001, school districts may not enter into tax
abatement agreements.' 9 3 The abatement statute was amended to clarify
that tax abatements for improvements are not effective until January 1 of
the tax year immediately following the date the improvements are com-
pleted.194 Tax abatement agreements may now be entered into with the
lessee of tax-exempt property. 95 The Texas Legislature also repealed a
burdensome provision of the abatement statute that required other taxing
units to join in a municipal tax abatement agreement within 90 days after
the date the municipality entered into the tax abatement agreement. 196
In November 2001, voters authorized two new property tax exemp-
tions. First, travel trailers that are not held for the production of income
are exempt. 197 Second, the voters authorized the Texas Legislature to
exempt a new category of goods-in-transit (similar to the Freeport goods
exemption). 198 However, the accompanying enabling legislation was not
adopted by the Texas Legislature; thus, this exemption will apply only if a
later session of the Texas Legislature adopts enabling legislation. The po-
tential new exemption would exempt property, other than oil, natural gas
and other petroleum products (but expressly covering aircraft and aircraft
parts) that: (a) is detained in Texas at a location that is not owned or
under the control of the property owner for assembling, storing, manufac-
turing, processing or fabricating by the person who acquired the property;
and (b) is transported to another location cover that is in the process of
being assembled, manufactured, stored, repaired, processed or fabricated,
and which is not detained in a location for more than 270 days after the
person acquired the property in or imported the property to Texas.199 If
the enabling legislation is passed, each taxing unit would decide whether
to grant the exemption.200
Section 25.07 was amended to provide that a convention center, visitor
center, sports facility, concert hall, arena or stadium that is owned by a
191. Id. § 313.024(b). This legislation effectively responds to school districts' practical
inability (due to school financing formulas) to grant property tax abatements in most cir-
cumstances, which has been an obstacle attracting some large projects to Texas in recent
years. See Cynthia Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 47 SMU L. REV. 1649, 1672 (1994).
192. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 312.006 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
193. Id. § 312.002(e); but see Fish Controls, 45 S.W.3d at 298.
194. Id. § 312.204(a).
195. Id. §§ 312.204(a), 312.210(b) and 312.402(a). Prior to this amendment, all tax
abatement agreements had to be with the owner of the property.
196. Id. § 312.206(a). Sections 312.204 and 312.402 also were amended to clarify that a
taxpayer does not lose his or her abatement if the owner is elected to a governing body of a
taxing unit that granted the exemption. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 312.204, 312.402.
197. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-j, 1-j-1.
198. Id. § 1-n.
199. Id. § 1-n(a).
200. Id. § 1-n(d).
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city or town and that is leased to a taxable entity is exempt to the lessee
so long as the facility is open to the public, regardless of whether a fee is
charged for admission.20 1 Amended section 21.031 provides that vessels
and watercraft under construction, and all tangible personal property in-
tended to be incorporated into such property, are presumed to be in in-
terstate, international or foreign commerce and not located in Texas for
more than a temporary time.2 02 This presumption is tantamount to an
exemption for this type of property.
In a piece of legislation that we may all regret only because of the num-
ber of irritating car leasing ads it has spurred, new section 11.252 exempts
from property tax leased motor vehicles if the lessee does not hold the
motor vehicle for the production of income and the motor vehicle is used
primarily for activities that do not involve the production of income. 20 3
A motor vehicle is presumed to be used primarily for non-production of
income activities if 50 percent or more of the miles driven in a year are
for non-income producing activities.20 4
House Bill 490205 made numerous changes to the procedural provisions
of the Tax Code, including requiring tax collectors to automatically re-
fund duplicate payments, 20 6 raising the maximum collection fees in delin-
quent tax cases, 207 making significant changes to the tax warrant process
and foreclosure process, 20 8 and enabling a taxing unit to obtain an injunc-
tion preventing personal property subject to delinquent taxes from leav-
ing the county or being transferred to a buyer that is not a buyer in the
ordinary course.209 Section 25.195 was amended to increase taxpayers'
right to information, including taxpayers' right to copy records at the ap-
praisal office and to inspect all records used by a private appraisal firm
hired by the appraisal district in valuing the taxpayer's property.210
Amended section 33.011(a) requires tax units to waive interest on prop-
erty taxes that are delinquent due to the appraisal district or tax unit's
error, and gives taxpayers three years to recover erroneously paid interest
and penalties. 21' Amended Section 11.251 provides that Freeport exemp-
tions may now be filed before the date the appraisal review board ap-
proves the appraisal records.212
201. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.07(b)(4)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
202. Id. § 21.031.
203. Id. § 11.252(a)(1)-(2).
204. Id. § 11.252(b).
205. H.R. 490, 77th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
206. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 31.111, 31.12 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
207. Id. §§ 33.07(a), 33.08(b).
208. Id. ch. 33.
209. Id. § 33.41.
210. Id. § 25.195.
211. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.011(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
212. Id. § 11.251. Section 11.31 includes several procedural changes to and administra-
tive guidelines for the application of the pollution control exemption, including requiring
the TNRCC to establish specific standards for the exemption to insure equality and uni-
formity and allowing appraisal districts to appeal TNRCC determinations concerning ex-
emptions. Id. § 11.31.
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IV. PROCEDURE AND LIABILITY
A. INTERPRETATION
As to personal liability, the court of appeals, in Parker v. Texas,213 de-
termined, without deciding whether Parker was individually liable under
Section 111.016,214 that the state had failed to meet its burden of produc-
ing "more than a scintilla of evidence showing how much tax money was
actually collected" 215 and not remitted.
Hearing No. 39,257216 addressed successor liability; the petitioner ar-
gued that it had no successor liability for tax owed by its predecessor,
because the petitioner had acquired the assets of the predecessor com-
pany through a foreclosure, rather than through a purchase. While not-
ing that a sale through a foreclosure is not generally considered a sale of a
business or stock of goods leading to successor liability, the ALJ ex-
amined the loan agreements that were at the heart of the transaction in
his analyses, noting that they referred to a sale of the collateral, rather
than a "taking back," and found the petitioner liable.
Hearing 37,967217 focused on the fiduciary responsibilities of officers
and directors, finding that the president of a computer manufacturing
company had check writing authority, had authority to disburse funds to
the corporation, and signed the returns of the company, and therefore
should be personally responsible for the taxes, based on Section
111.016.218
Hearing No. 37,107219 offers a warning to participants in oral hearings,
including the comptroller's hearing section, that Texas procedural rules
apply to the hearings. The petitioner and the AHS had reached an agree-
ment that certain items were to be considered new construction and an-
nounced the agreement in open court at the oral hearing. However, the
AHS then sought to withdraw the agreement, believing that the AHS had
misread some of the relevant precedents. The ALJ refused to grant the
withdrawal, on the grounds that it would prejudice the petitioner, who
would be unable to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses on the
issue. The ALJ cited Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 220
and Porter v. Holt221 for the proposition that such withdrawals are "ex-
tremely disfavored."
In another case dealing primarily with procedural matters,222 the peti-
tioner contended that it was not in existence at the time that the notifica-
tion for the audit was issued, or at the time of the hearing, and therefore
213. 36 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000) (judgment withdrawn Jan. 11, 2001).
214. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
215. Parker, 36 S.W.3d at 618.
216. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,257 (April 20, 2001).
217. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,967 (March 16, 2001).
218. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
219. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,107 (Nov. 9, 2000).
220. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
221. 73 Tex. 447, 11 S.W. 494 (1889).
222. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,028 (January 25, 2001).
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could not be held liable for the amount owed. The ALJ found these facts
irrelevant because the petitioner was in existence for the time period that
the audit covered. More interestingly, the ALJ also determined that it
was not relevant that the petitioner had received a certification (errone-
ous, as it turned out) that all taxes had been paid; the judge pointed out
that the petitioner knew that the certification was an error. As the ALJ
noted, a foreign corporation remains liable for a sales tax deficiency up to
three years after the date of dissolution.223
On September 28, 2001, the comptroller's office, by internal memoran-
dum,22 4 addressed a potential discrepancy in interpretation between the
audit division's and tax policy's view of Tax Code Section 111.206.225 This
section provides an exception to the statute of limitations for determina-
tions resulting from administrative proceedings. The audit division inter-
pretation, upheld by the internal memorandum, concludes that the
statute is a narrow one which extends the statute of limitations for re-
funds only to the extent they are related to adjustments made by a regula-
tory agency, whereas the tax policy division of the comptroller's staff had
(correctly) taken the position that section 111.206226 keeps the limitation
period open during the period involved in the proceeding for refund
claims even if the claims are unrelated to the regulatory adjustments. It
will be interesting to see whether this statutory interpretation is subject to
further challenge or litigation.227
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In addition to several other procedural changes, the legislature also au-
thorized the comptroller to require by rule that certain taxpayers may be
required to pay by electronic funds transfer.228
Senate Bill 1123,229 the comptroller's first official enforcement bill in
some twelve years, provides the comptroller with additional means of en-
suring tax compliance. An overview of Senate Bill 1123 makes clear the
frustration the comptroller has experienced with taxpayers who sell prop-
erty out of trucks by the highway, or from boats in the harbor, and then
disappear before the comptroller staff is able to secure sufficient informa-
tion to assess-let alone collect-taxes. Given this background, the addi-
tional authority given to the comptroller, such as the right to photograph
records and to require taxpayers under pain of criminal penalty to pro-
duce certain written records within ten days, could be viewed as reasona-
ble. However, statutory authority that could arguably be interpreted to
allow the comptroller's auditor to "examine, copy, and photograph the
books, returns, records, and papers of equipment relating to the conduct
223. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art 7.12A.(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
224. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing 200109582L (Sept. 28, 2001).
225. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.206 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
226. Id.
227. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200109582L.
228. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.0625 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
229. S.J. Res. 1123, 77th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (2001).
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in question" 230 virtually at will clearly poses the risk of abuse. Almost
surprisingly, the enforcement provisions in this bill failed to attract much
attention from outside the comptroller's office until near the end of the
legislative session. In the waning days of the legislature's focus on this
bill, several practitioners met with comptroller staff to discuss concerns
with its enforcement mechanisms. These practitioners sought and re-
ceived assurance that the comptroller's staff would put procedures in
place to ensure that taxpayers' rights would not be violated.
The legislature also added additional criminal penalties for several ac-
tivities, including failure to remit tax collected, selling without a sales tax
permit, and failure to furnish a required tax report.231
In addition to the enforcement mechanisms mentioned above, the en-
forcement bill is significant for its focus on successor liability. Texas, like
many states, often seeks to collect certain taxes, including sales and
franchise taxes, from the buyer of the assets of a business. 232 Once again,
a review of the remedies the comptroller requested makes clear the type
of challenges the comptroller has faced. For example, as amended in
2001, section 111.020233 now provides that the buyer's withholding an
amount from the purchase price to pay unpaid taxes will no longer be a
defense to a tax assessment in circumstances when the price paid to the
seller for the asset "is not reasonably equivalent to the value of the busi-
ness or stock of goods. '234 The comptroller is also armed with a new
section 111.024,235 which provides for additional liability in fraudulent
transfer cases. Pursuant to this new section, a person who acquires the
assets of a business "through a fraudulent transfer or a sham transaction"
is liable for any tax penalty and interest owed by the taxpayer.236 This
section further sets out a laundry list of factors to be considered in deter-
mining fraudulent intent, e.g. whether the transfer was to a current or
former business insider or to a taxpayer who retains possession or control
of the business and whether the taxpayer was insolvent at the time of the
transfer, or soon after.237
House Bill 1845238 directs the comptroller to enter into a streamlined
sales and use agreement with other states to implement a simplified tax
system. This legislation, which adds Chapter 142 to the Tax Code, in-
cludes a legislative finding that "a simplified sales and use tax system will
reduce and over time eliminate the burden and cost of all vendors to
collect the state's sales and use tax,"' 239 and results in ten new sections
that, while not generally part of the Sales Use Tax Chapter of the Code,
230. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.023(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
231. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.7032, 151.708, and 709 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
232. Id. § 111.020.
233. Id. § 111.020(f).
234. Id. § 111.020(f)(2).
235. Id. § 111.024.
236. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.024(a).
237. Id. at § 111.024(c).
238. H.R. 1845, 77th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
239. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 142.003 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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have the potential to influence significantly the future of Texas sales and
use tax. Although the comptroller is "authorized and directed to partici-
pate in Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreements with one or more
states," 240 and the statute authorizes the comptroller or the comptroller's
designee to represent the state, any required legislative changes (e.g., to
adopt new definitions) are not self-executing; instead, such changes must
be enacted by the Texas Legislature.24'
New section 142.007242 further provides that the comptroller may not
enter into such an agreement unless certain conditions are met. For ex-
ample, an agreement entered into pursuant to this section must set re-
strictions to limit over time the number of state rates, must establish
uniform standards for sourcing, and must fulfill several other require-
ments of a simplified sales tax agreement.
Other significant procedural changes enacted by the legislature involve
contract auditors. New section 151.0232 authorizes the comptroller to es-
tablish by rule a program pursuant to which a taxpayer may hire a certi-
fied public accountant, not employed by the comptroller, to audit the
taxpayer for sales tax purposes. 243 The comptroller has been working on
a proposed new Rule 3.368, dealing with contract auditors. Although still
under discussion, the rule would establish certain requirements for both
the auditing CPAs and the audited taxpayers. 244
The legislature also enacted a new section requiring the comptroller to
develop an advanced electronic database system for audits.
245
One of the most interesting of the bills that did not become law is
House Bill 2809, which attempted to challenge the judiciary's interpreta-
tion of a tax statute in Fleming Foods v. Rylander.2 46 The official bill
analysis chastises the Texas Supreme Court for concluding that a revision
to the Tax Code effected a substantive change rather than following the
legislature's "repeated and clear statements" that the statutory changes
were intended to be nonsubstantive. Although passed by the legislature,
the bill was vetoed by the governor. If enacted, the bill would purport-
edly have required the judiciary to follow legislative intent as to nonsub-
stantive recodification, notwithstanding a legislative change that the court
240. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 142.005(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
241. Id. § 142.006.
242. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 142.007 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
243. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 151.0232(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
244. Under this proposed rule, in order for a certified public accountant to participate
in the CPA audit program, the CPA must not be delinquent for any state tax for which the
CPA is liable; the CPA must not be associated with a firm that is delinquent for any state
tax; and the CPA must complete the minimum training that the comptroller requires (likely
to include passing an examination, signing a confidentiality agreement, and obtaining an
authorization card). Taxpayer participation appears likely to be limited to taxpayers that
do not fall within a certain classification account set up by the comptroller (e.g., very large
taxpayers), that are not routinely audited by the comptroller, and that have received a
notice of an upcoming sales and use tax audit.
245. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.0034 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
246. 6 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 1999); see also Cynthia M. Ohlenforst & Jeff W. Dorrill, Taxa-
tion, 53 SMU L. REV. 1297, 1299-1301 (2000) (discussing this case).
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"would otherwise find to be direct, unambiguous, and irreconcilable with
prior law."'247
V. CONCLUSION
Although this was not a landmark year in terms of substantial changes
to the Tax Code, the relatively large number of legislative changes, and of
tax interpretations, make it impossible to cover all the developments in
the scope of a short Survey article, necessitating the omission of not only
some regulatory developments, but also of some statutory provisions and
interpretations-not to mention some tax cases that fall outside the scope
of this year's Survey.2 48 However, because the Survey article will be in
print by the 4th of July, the authors would hate to omit the fact that,
effective October 1, 2001, fireworks are subject to an additional two per-
cent retail sales tax.249
247. H.B. 2809, § 1 (adding § 311.033 to the Government Code).
248. Two of the most interesting recent cases involve insurance. In Dow Chemical v.
Rylander, 38 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied), the court held that the
state may not impose independently provided insurance tax on Dow under the Supreme
Court's decision in Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962). As the Dow court noted,
"the Supreme Court's holding that Texas' independently procured insurance tax violated
[federal law] ... [c]uriously... has not dissuaded the comptroller from levying this tax."
Id. at 745. (Ironically, perhaps, the comptroller announced her intent to appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.) In USAA v. Rylander, No. GN103404, a refund suit pend-
ing in Travis County District Court, USAA asserts (not inconsistently with literal statutory
language) that insurance companies should not be required to pay any taxes such as sales
taxes other than gross premium taxes imposed by Chapter 4 of the Texas Insurance Code.
249. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 161.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002) ("Fireworks Tax").
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